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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Haddrick Byrd, a prisoner at SCI-Frackville, filed a 
pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania alleging that various Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees violated his 
Eighth Amendment rights and were negligent under state law.  
Byrd appeals the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment to DOC employees V. Stanishefski, Jack Robinson, 
and H. Spencer, and the District Court‟s refusal to reconsider 
its order granting a motion to dismiss for DOC employees 
Robert Shannon and Dorina Varner.  Instead of paying a 
docketing fee on appeal, Byrd filed a motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis (“IFP”).  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will deny Byrd‟s request to proceed IFP. 
I. 
At all times material to this appeal, Byrd was an 
inmate at SCI-Frackville.  Byrd‟s pro se complaint of August 
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13, 2009 named the following defendants:  (1) Robert 
Shannon, the Superintendent of SCI-Frackville; (2) V. 
Stanishefski, the Corrections Health Care Administrator at 
SCI-Frackville; (3) Jack Robinson, the Supervising Nurse at 
SCI-Frackville; (4) H. Spencer, a nurse at SCI-Frackville; and 
(5) Dorina Varner, the Chief Grievance Officer for the DOC.  
Byrd specifically alleges that these DOC employees showed 
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing 
to provide him with prescription eye drops for his glaucoma, 
thus depriving him of his Eighth Amendment rights and 
committing negligence under state law. 
Byrd proceeded IFP in the District Court after his 
application to do so was granted on September 9, 2009.  The 
District Court, on February 22, 2010, granted defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss in part, dismissing Shannon and Varner.  
On February 28, 2011, the District Court granted the 
remaining defendants‟ motion for summary judgment. 
 On April 5, 2011, Byrd filed a motion to proceed IFP 
on appeal.  That same day, the Clerk‟s Office notified Byrd 
that he had “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and had 
to file a motion showing that he was in imminent danger of 
serious physical injury in order to be eligible for IFP status.  
Byrd‟s three potential strikes included two cases that were 
clearly dismissed for failure to state a claim:  (1) Byrd v. 
Parris, No. 99-cv-00769 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1999) and 
(2) Byrd v. City of Philadelphia, No. 06-cv-01957 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 10, 2006).  The other potential strike, Byrd v. Gillis, 
C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002), was an appeal that 
was dismissed by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
because it was “without merit.”  In response to the 
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notification by the Clerk‟s Office, Byrd did not file a motion 
alleging imminent danger; instead, he submitted a response 
on April 19, 2011, arguing that the Clerk‟s Office made a 
mistake in determining that he had three strikes.  Byrd noted 
that, although he brought two prior actions that were 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, he did not proceed IFP 
in those actions. 
 In the January 12, 2012 order appointing amicus 
curiae, this Court instructed amicus to address whether 
dismissals of non-IFP actions and appeals can count as strikes 
under § 1915(g), or whether only IFP actions and appeals can 
count as strikes.  The Court also stated that “[a]micus counsel 
may wish to address the relevance, if any, of the fact that 28 
U.S.C. section 1915(e) and section 1915(g) use similar 
phrasing . . . that varies slightly from the language of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” 
 On February 28, 2012, amicus requested to expand the 
scope of its appointment.  Specifically, amicus sought leave 
to address whether this Court‟s dismissal of one of Byrd‟s 
previous cases, Byrd v. Gillis, C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. July 
30, 2002), constituted a strike.  On March 8, 2012, this Court 
granted in part and denied in part amicus‟s motion to expand 
the scope of its representation.  The Court permitted amicus 
to argue, with respect to Byrd v. Gillis, that “when an action is 
dismissed for a reason that is unclear, that dismissal does not 
count as a strike.” 
II. 
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 We have jurisdiction of this matter as an appeal of a 
final decision in the District Court.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The 
District Court did not address whether Byrd‟s eligibility for 
IFP status was foreclosed by the three strikes provision of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g).  We now address this issue as a matter of 
first impression.
1
 
III. 
A. 
 In order to determine Byrd‟s IFP eligibility, we must 
decide whether “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) can be 
accrued in actions or appeals where the prisoner has prepaid 
the filing fee, or whether “strikes” can only be accrued in IFP 
actions or appeals.  Section 1915(g), enacted as a part of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), states: 
                                              
1
 Because we hold that Byrd is not entitled to IFP 
status due to the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g), and Byrd has not paid the docketing fee, we do not 
reach the merits of Byrd‟s appeal.  See Hafed v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The „three 
strikes‟ provision of the [IFP] statute applicable to indigent 
prisoners requires so-called „frequent filer‟ prisoners to 
prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider 
their civil actions and appeals.”).  If Byrd pays the docketing 
fee within 14 days of the issuance of the order in this case, 
see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.3, L.A.R. Misc. 107.1, the appeal shall 
be returned to this panel for further consideration of the 
merits. 
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“In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action 
or appeal a judgment in a civil action or 
proceeding under this section if the prisoner 
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought 
an action or appeal in a court of the United 
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it 
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted, unless the 
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury.” 
 Three of our sister courts of appeals have held that 
strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals regardless of 
whether the prisoner has prepaid the filing fee or is 
proceeding IFP.  See Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 350 
Fed. App‟x 278, 279 (10th Cir. 2009); Hyland v. Clinton, 3 
Fed. App‟x 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2001); Duvall v. Miller, 122 
 8 
F.3d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1997).  No court of appeals has held 
that strikes may only be accrued in IFP actions or appeals.
2
 
This situation presents an issue of statutory 
interpretation.  Our task is to give effect to the will of 
Congress, and where Congress‟s will has been expressed in 
language that has a reasonably plain meaning, that language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.  Negonsott v. 
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993); see also Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., LTD v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012) 
(“We begin where all such inquiries must begin:  with the 
language of the statute itself.”).  If the language of the statute 
has a reasonably plain meaning, then our sole function is to 
                                              
2
 This Court, in appointing amicus, expressed its 
understanding that there was a circuit split on this issue 
because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had 
implied that only IFP actions or appeals could be counted as 
strikes under § 1915(g).  See Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. 
Ctr. Med. Facility, 15 F.3d 775, 780-81 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(listing only dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a provision 
that only applies to IFP actions or appeals, as the types of 
dismissals that count as strikes).  Amicus, in a commendable 
act of candor, brought to our attention the fact that the Tenth 
Circuit, in subsequent cases, rejected the argument that 
§ 1915(g) strikes could only be accrued in IFP actions or 
appeals.  See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1177 (holding that dismissals 
under § 1915A, a provision that is not limited to IFP actions 
or appeals, can count as strikes); Burghart v. Corr. Corp. of 
Am., 350 Fed. App‟x 278, 279 (10th Cir. 2009) (explicitly 
holding that non-IFP actions or appeals can count as strikes). 
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enforce the statute‟s language.  United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
In determining whether the language of a particular 
statutory provision has a plain meaning, the language shall be 
considered in the context of the entire statute.  Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (stating that statutory 
interpretation focuses on “the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole”); see also Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(interpreting one particular section of the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(g), in the context of the PLRA as a whole).  The plain 
meaning of statutory language is not conclusive only when 
“the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.”  Ron 
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
Statutory purpose and legislative history may be 
referenced only if the statutory language is without a plain 
meaning, i.e., if the statutory language is ambiguous.  In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Statutory language is ambiguous only where it is “reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations.”  Id. (quoting Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985)). 
Here, the statutory language has a reasonably plain 
meaning – “an action or appeal” is not limited to an IFP 
action or appeal; rather, it refers to both IFP and non-IFP 
actions or appeals.  The three strikes provision, § 1915(g), 
does not make an explicit exception for previous actions or 
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appeals where the prisoner was not granted IFP status.  See 
Burghart, 350 Fed. App‟x at 279 (“[Plaintiff] argues that 
Congress did not intend § 1915(g) to apply to prisoners who 
had not filed their earlier cases IFP.  However, § 1915(g) 
makes no distinction.”); Hyland, 3 Fed. App‟x at 479 
(“[Section] 1915(g) does not distinguish between prior in 
forma pauperis actions and prior actions in which the fee was 
paid.”); Duvall, 122 F.3d at 490 (“[Section 1915(g)] does not 
say, „brought an action or appeal in forma pauperis,‟ or 
„brought an action or appeal under this section.‟”). 
We acknowledge that this Court, in Santana v. United 
States, found the phrase “civil actions” in another part of the 
PLRA to “lack a plain meaning.”  98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 
1996) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) and holding that the 
filing fee requirements of the PLRA with regard to “civil 
actions” did not apply to IFP habeas corpus petitions and 
appeals).  This Court‟s analysis in Santana, however, focused 
on the unique nature of habeas corpus actions.  Id. at 754.  In 
contrast to habeas corpus actions, standard non-IFP actions 
are not, “in effect, hybrid actions whose nature is not 
adequately captured by the phrase „civil action.‟”  Id.  Thus, 
Santana does not compel a conclusion that the phrase “an 
action or appeal” in § 1915(g) lacks a plain meaning. 
The same can be said for Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hospital, wherein this Court stated that § 1915(e)(2)(B), 
which uses language that closely tracks the three strikes 
provision of § 1915(g), is limited to IFP actions or appeals.  
293 F.3d 103, 109 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although the 
language of § 1915(e)(2) does not expressly limit the 
provision‟s reach to in forma pauperis claims, we believe 
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Congress intended it to be so limited.”).  We do not find 
Grayson to be controlling.  First, the finding in Grayson – 
that  § 1915(e)(2) applies only to IFP actions or appeals – is 
dicta; it was not necessary to the Court‟s holding, which was 
that the district court was required to grant leave to amend 
before dismissing a pro se inmate‟s action for failure to state a 
claim.  Id. at 114.  Second, the Grayson Court based its 
finding in part on the fact that any alternative interpretation of 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) would render similar provisions of the PLRA 
superfluous.  Id. at 109 n.10 (citing Benson v. O’Brian, 179 
F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]f all actions, whether 
pursued in forma pauperis or not, are to be screened by the 
district court pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the specific prisoner 
complaint screening provision, § 1915A, would be rendered 
largely superfluous.”)).  In contrast to § 1915(e)(2)(B), if 
§ 1915(g) were interpreted to encompass non-IFP actions and 
appeals, no other provision of the PLRA, including § 1915A, 
would be rendered superfluous. 
Finally, we acknowledge amicus‟s argument that the 
language difference between § 1915(g) and Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is instructive as to the 
meaning of “an action or appeal.”  Section 1915(g), just like 
the IFP specific provision, § 1915(e)(2)(B), which was the 
focus of Grayson, refers to an action that “fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted,” while Rule 12(b)(6) 
refers to an action that “fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.”  Amicus argues that this contrast 
between “may” and “can” indicates that Congress used “may” 
in § 1915(g) as a signal to reference § 1915(e) dismissals, 
which occur only in IFP actions and appeals, as opposed to 
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Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, which occur in both IFP and non-
IFP actions.  Although this argument is of some persuasive 
effect, it does not render the phrase “an action or appeal” to 
be without a plain meaning.  The bottom line remains that 
Congress could have easily differentiated between IFP and 
non-IFP actions or appeals in the language of § 1915(g), but it 
did not.  It is more rational to suppose that if Congress 
intended to make an exception for non-IFP cases in 
§ 1915(g), then it would have explicitly done so, rather than 
merely using the word “may” instead of “can.” 
Thus, strikes may be accrued in actions or appeals 
regardless of whether the prisoner has prepaid the filing fee or 
is proceeding IFP, and Byrd‟s previous non-IFP actions, 
which were dismissed for failure to state a claim, count as 
strikes for purposes of § 1915(g).  Because this literal 
application of the statute will not likely increase the incidence 
of frivolous suits from prisoners, it will not “produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.”  Ron 
Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242. 
B. 
 Amicus, in support of Byrd, argues that even if non-
IFP actions and appeals can count as strikes, Byrd has only 
two strikes, rather than three, because this Court‟s dismissal 
of Byrd‟s appeal in Byrd v. Gillis, C.A. No. 01-3868 (3d Cir. 
July 30, 2002) under § 1915(e)(2)(B) does not constitute a 
strike.  We disagree. 
 In Byrd v. Gillis, Byrd brought suit in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against prison officials in their 
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individual and official capacities for failing to investigate a 
false misconduct report against him.  No. 01-cv-0576, slip op. 
at 1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2001).  As a result of the misconduct 
report, Byrd was placed in the restrictive housing unit for 60 
days.  Id. at 5.  Byrd alleged that he was “subjected to the 
denial of due process, equal protection under the law, denial 
of religious practices, retaliation, malfeasance, non-feasance, 
and misfeasance.”  Id. at 1.  The Magistrate Judge3 granted 
the defendants‟ motion for summary judgment and concluded 
that, except for Byrd‟s due process claim regarding his 
misconduct hearing, Byrd failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.  Id. at 6-12.  In regard to Byrd‟s due process claim, 
the Magistrate Judge held that Byrd‟s placement in the 
restricted housing unit did not implicate a protected liberty 
interest under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 
(1995).  Id. at 14-16.  Additionally, in regard to Byrd‟s 
official capacity claims, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
the prison officials were immune from suit.  Id. at 13-14.  
Byrd‟s state law claims were held to be barred under the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Id. 
 On appeal, this Court held that the Magistrate Judge 
properly granted summary judgment.  Byrd v. Gillis, C.A. No. 
01-3868, slip op. at 4 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002).  The Court 
explicitly agreed that Byrd failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, that the alleged conduct did not 
implicate a protected liberty interest, and that the Eleventh 
                                              
3
 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate 
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
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Amendment barred Byrd‟s state law claims.4  Id. at 3-4.  The 
Court ultimately dismissed the entire appeal under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit.”  Id. at 4. 
 Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides: 
“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if 
the court determines that – the action or appeal 
– (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who 
is immune from such relief.” 
The consideration of whether a dismissal under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) should count as a strike under § 1915(g) 
sometimes requires an examination of the § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
dismissal.  This is because § 1915(e)(2)(B) includes a ground 
for dismissal – defendant‟s immunity from suit – that does 
not qualify as a strike under § 1915(g), which involves 
dismissals for actions or appeals that are “frivolous, 
malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.” 
 We decline to adopt a categorical rule that courts, in 
dismissing actions and appeals under § 1915(e)(2)(B), must 
precisely indicate that the action or appeal is “frivolous or 
                                              
4
 The Court did not expressly indicate its agreement 
with the Magistrate Judge that the defendants were immune 
from suit with regard to Byrd‟s claims against them in their 
official capacities. 
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malicious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted” in order for the dismissal to count as a strike under 
§ 1915(g).  Instead, we adopt a position similar to that of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and clarify that 
when a court dismisses an action or appeal under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), without more specificity, our determination 
of whether the dismissal constitutes a strike is “not formalistic 
or mechanical; rather, we must consider the nature of the 
dismissal and . . . whether the dismissal fits within the 
 16 
language of § 1915(g).”5  Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
635 F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011).
6
 
 Our dissenting colleague emphasizes that strikes 
should not accrue for “mixed dismissals,” i.e., those 
dismissals that are based in part on a § 1915(g) ground, and in 
part on other grounds.  We agree.  In applying this case-
                                              
5
 In adopting this position, we do not condone a 
reviewing court holding that a previous dismissal constitutes 
a strike under § 1915(g) merely because frivolousness is 
suspected or the phrase “without merit” was used in the 
dismissal.  Instead, a case-specific, non-mechanical 
examination of the dismissal – which could lead to a strike 
being accrued where the dismissing court did not precisely 
indicate that the action or appeal was frivolous, malicious, or 
failed to state a claim – is warranted only when the action or 
appeal was dismissed generally under a PLRA provision, 
such as § 1915(e)(2)(B), without more specificity, as was the 
case in Byrd v. Gillis. 
6
 The Hafed case is instructive.  There, a district court 
ambiguously dismissed a prisoner‟s complaint under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) without clearly indicating whether it was 
relying on § 1915A(b)(1) for frivolousness, or § 1915A(b)(2) 
for suing an immune defendant.  The Court of Appeals 
determined that even though the district court mentioned the 
defendant‟s immunity, “the immunity ground for dismissal 
was subsumed in frivolousness.”  The Court thus counted the 
dismissal as a strike for purposes of § 1915(g).  Hafed, 635 
F.3d at 1178. 
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specific, non-mechanical approach, we consider the nature of 
the § 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal and determine whether the 
entire dismissal fits within the language of § 1915(g).  See 
Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 651-52 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(“[Section] 1915(g) requires that a prisoner‟s entire „action or 
appeal‟ be dismissed on enumerated grounds in order to count 
as a strike”). 
 In Byrd v. Gillis, in addition to affirming that Byrd 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and failed to 
identify a protected liberty interest, the Court agreed with the 
Magistrate Judge‟s conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred Byrd‟s state law claims.  The Court, however, did not 
indicate that it was relying on § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) 
(concerning immunity) to dismiss any part of the appeal.  
Instead, in dismissing the appeal in its entirety, the Court 
stated generally that it was relying on § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
because the appeal was “without merit.”  Consequently, we 
must determine whether the dismissal of the appeal under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit” fits within the 
language of § 1915(g). 
 In making this determination, we reiterate that a 
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) occurs because the action or 
appeal (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim; 
or (3) seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is 
immune from suit.  With regard to an appeal of summary 
judgment, such as in Byrd v. Gillis, the reason for a dismissal 
under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is necessarily limited to either the 
appeal‟s frivolous or malicious nature or the defendant‟s 
immunity from suit.  For the following reasons, we believe 
that the Court‟s dismissal of Byrd‟s appeal under 
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit” is 
appropriately viewed as a dismissal for frivolousness, rather 
than as a dismissal for suing an immune defendant. 
 First, the Court dismissed the entire appeal as being 
“without merit,” and a dismissal based on the appeal‟s 
frivolous nature addresses the entire appeal, whereas a 
dismissal based on the defendants‟ immunity addresses only 
some of Byrd‟s claims; namely, his state law claims and his 
claims against the defendants in their official capacities.  
Second, the phrase “without merit” and similar variations are 
often associated with the word “frivolous” in the context of 
§ 1915.  See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (finding that a prisoner‟s “claim based on an 
indisputably meritless legal theory may be dismissed as 
frivolous [under § 1915]”) (emphasis added).  This is true in 
other areas of our jurisprudence as well.  For example, in 
regard to damages for frivolous appeals under Rule 38 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, we have held that “[a]n 
appeal is frivolous if it is wholly without merit.”  Quiroga v. 
Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis 
added); see also Hilmon Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 
250, 251 (3d Cir. 1990) (“In this circuit an appeal is 
considered frivolous when it is utterly without merit.”) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Also, 
in interpreting the Federal Revenue Code, we have held that a 
civil penalty is warranted when “the taxpayer assert[s] a 
position that is frivolous, i.e., meritless, from the perspective 
of the tax laws.”  Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1214 
(3d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
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 Therefore, this Court‟s dismissal of the appeal in Byrd 
v. Gillis under § 1915(e)(2)(B) because it was “without merit” 
constitutes a strike for purposes of § 1915(g).  Byrd has three 
strikes and is ineligible for IFP status. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Byrd‟s request 
to proceed IFP in this appeal.
7
 
                                              
7
 We express gratitude to the director and students of 
the Appellate Litigation Clinic at the Earle Mack School of 
Law at Drexel University for an excellent presentation of the 
issues as court-appointed amicus curiae. 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part:  
   
As noted by the majority, under the “three strikes” 
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), once a prisoner has, on 
three occasions, “brought an action or appeal . . . that was 
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” that 
prisoner is barred from bringing any further civil actions 
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”).  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  In my view, the primary question in this 
appeal is whether an action that is not explicitly dismissed for 
being “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ing] to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted” can count as a strike under 
§ 1915(g).  The majority holds that it can.  I respectfully 
disagree. 
 
At issue is our dismissal of Byrd‟s appeal in Byrd v. 
Gillis, which we dismissed as being “without merit . . . 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).”  C.A. No. 01-3868, 
slip op. at 4 (3d Cir. July 30, 2002).  I disagree with the 
majority that this dismissal counts as Byrd‟s second strike.  
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of the PLRA provides that a court shall 
dismiss an action or appeal at any time if it “determines that – 
the action or appeal – (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to 
state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks 
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 
relief.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Thus, while the first two 
prongs of § 1915(e)(2)(B) track the language of § 1915(g), 
the third prong – defendant‟s immunity from suit – is not a 
basis for a strike under § 1915(g).  
 
2 
 
In dismissing Byrd‟s appeal in Gillis, we did not 
specify which prong of § 1915(e)(2)(B) we relied on.  
However, as the majority notes, “[w]ith regard to an appeal of 
summary judgment, such as in Byrd v. Gillis, the reason for a 
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B) is necessarily limited to 
either the appeal‟s frivolous or malicious nature or the 
defendant‟s immunity from suit.”  Majority Op. at 17.  It is 
undisputed that the Gillis court found that Byrd‟s state law 
claims were foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment because 
the prison officials involved were immune from suit.  
Furthermore, while it ultimately determined that Byrd‟s 
appeal lacked merit, the Gillis court made no explicit finding 
that the claims foreclosed by immunity were “frivolous, 
malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.”   
 
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “we cannot read into 
[a court‟s] decision a ground for dismissal that [it] did not 
state, and which would also substantially limit [the prisoner‟s] 
ability to file a lawsuit.”  Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521, 
523 (7th Cir. 2011).  Because the dismissal in Gillis was not 
explicitly and entirely based on grounds covered by 
§ 1915(g), I would hold that the 2002 dismissal in Gillis does 
not qualify as a strike.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
with respect to Part III.B of the majority opinion. 
 
 The weight of circuit authority indicates that “mixed 
dismissals” – those based in part on a § 1915(g) strike 
ground, and in part on other grounds – do not count as 
strikes.
1
  In Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 
                                              
1
 See Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 647, 651-52 (4th 
Cir. 2011); Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 
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the D.C. Circuit held that “actions containing at least one 
claim falling within none of the three strike categories . . . do 
not count as strikes.”  492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
The Thompson court reasoned that “[s]ection 1915(g) speaks 
of dismissal of „actions and appeals,‟ not „claims.‟”  Id.  
Furthermore, in Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 
2011), the Fourth Circuit concluded that, “consistent with the 
view of the majority of circuits to consider the issue, [] the 
plain language of § 1915(g) applies only to actions dismissed 
entirely as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a 
claim.”  Id. at 647 (emphasis in original).  See also Haury, 
656 F.3d at 523 (“Because the district court . . . did not 
dismiss the entirety of [the prisoner‟s] earlier case for one of 
the three bases listed in § 1915(g), the district court erred in 
part on grounds of immunity.”).  In light of this authority, I 
would agree with the view that, to count as a strike, a 
dismissal must rest entirely on grounds set forth in § 1915(g).  
                                                                                                     
2011); Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 
432, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Mayfield v. Texas Dep’t 
of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599, 617 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that prisoner did not incur a strike because some of 
his claims should have survived through the summary 
judgment stage); Powells v. Minnehaha Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 
198 F.3d 711, 713 (8th Cir.1999) (“The reversal as to some of 
Powells‟s claims in No. 98-4160 eliminates one of the „three 
strikes‟ that was the basis for the District Court‟s dismissal of 
the two later-filed cases.”).  But see Pointer v. Wilkinson, 502 
F.3d 369, 376 (6th Cir.2007) (“[W]here an entire complaint is 
dismissed, in part for failure to exhaust and in part for one of 
the grounds stated in § 1915(g), the dismissal should count as 
a strike.”). 
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A dismissal based in part on grounds not stated in § 1915(g) 
should not count as a strike.   
 
The majority agrees with this assessment, see Majority 
Op. at 16, and acknowledges that the Gillis court did not 
specify which prong of § 1915(e)(2)(B) it relied on in 
dismissing Byrd‟s suit, id. at 17.  However, it  
 
decline[s] to adopt a categorical rule that courts, 
in dismissing actions and appeals under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), must precisely indicate that the 
action or appeal is “frivolous or malicious” or 
“fails to state a claim on which relief may be 
granted” in order for the dismissal to count as a 
strike under § 1915(g). 
 
Id. at 14-15.  Instead, it adopts a position similar to that of the 
Tenth Circuit in Hafed v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, and 
holds that, 
 
when a court dismisses an action or appeal 
under § 1915(e)(2)(B), without more 
specificity, our determination of whether the 
dismissal constitutes a strike is “not formalistic 
or mechanical; rather, we must consider the 
nature of the dismissal and . . . whether the 
dismissal fits within the language of § 1915(g).” 
 
Id. at 15-16 (quoting Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 
F.3d 1172, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 
Applying this holding, the majority concludes that 
Gillis does not constitute a “mixed dismissal” (in part of 
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grounds of immunity), but “is appropriately viewed as a 
dismissal for frivolousness, rather than as a dismissal for 
suing an immune defendant.”  Id. at 18.  In arriving at this 
determination the majority reasons that,  
 
the [Gillis] Court dismissed the entire appeal as 
being “without merit,” and a dismissal based on 
the appeal‟s frivolous nature addresses the 
entire appeal, whereas a dismissal based on the 
defendants‟ immunity addresses only some of 
Byrd‟s claims; namely, his state law claims and 
his claims against the defendants in their 
official capacities. 
 
Id. (emphasis in original).  The majority appears to be 
operating under the assumption that, because the Gillis court 
dismissed Byrd‟s entire appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B), it must 
have dismissed each of the claims brought on appeal under 
the same prong of § 1915(e)(2)(B).  This is not necessarily so. 
 
Indeed, it is entirely possible that, in dismissing the 
appeal as “without merit” under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Gillis 
court intended to dismiss Byrd‟s state law claims under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) as foreclosed by immunity, and the rest 
of his claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous.  The 
majority‟s reliance on the fact that the Gillis court “did not 
indicate that it was relying on § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) 
(concerning immunity) to dismiss any part of the appeal,” id. 
at 17, provides little evidence for its position.  The Gillis 
court also did not indicate that it was relying on 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (concerning frivolousness) in dismissing 
the suit, which it could have – and presumably would have – 
if it meant to dismiss the entire suit as frivolous.  Instead, it 
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dismissed the appeal as “without merit” under 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), which encompasses dismissal on both 
frivolousness grounds and immunity grounds. 
 
 In recasting the dismissal in Gillis as one for 
frivolousness so that it will fit within the language of 
§ 1915(g), the majority contends that “the phrase „without 
merit‟” is “often associated with the word „frivolous‟ in the 
context of § 1915(g)” as well as “in other areas of our 
jurisprudence.”  Id. at 18.  In my view, the majority 
incorrectly equates the words “without merit” with the term 
“frivolous.”2  While it is true that a “frivolous” action lacks 
merit, it does not follow that an action that is “without merit” 
                                              
2
 Notably, in each of the cases cited by the majority in support 
of its position, the words “without merit” and similar 
variations are preceded by a modifier, indicating that lack of 
merit alone does not make an action “frivolous.”  See Deutsch 
v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995) (“a claim 
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory may be 
dismissed as frivolous under [§ 1915]”) (emphasis added); 
Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“An appeal is frivolous if it is wholly without merit.”) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); Hilmon Co. (V.I.), Inc. v. 
Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 251 (3d Cir. 1990) (“In this circuit 
an appeal is considered frivolous when it is utterly without 
merit.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1214 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“the government argues that Emily Kahn‟s claim for a „war 
tax refusal‟ credit was wholly without legal foundation and 
therefore „frivolous‟ within the meaning of section 
6702(a)(2)(A)” of the Internal Revenue Code) (emphasis 
added).  No such modifier was used in the Gillis opinion. 
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is necessarily “frivolous.”  See, e.g., McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 
F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An appeal is frivolous 
when the result is obvious and the arguments on appeal 
wholly lack merit.  An appeal that lacks merit is not 
necessarily frivolous.” (citation omitted)).  Indeed, courts 
routinely use the words “without merit” to refer to arguments 
advanced by litigants without meaning to say that the 
argument is frivolous.  The Supreme Court stressed this 
distinction in Anders v.  California, in which it found that a 
California court‟s determination that a petitioner‟s appeal had 
“no merit” explicitly did not constitute a “finding of 
frivolity.”  Anders,  386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967); see id. (“[The 
court] failed . . . to say whether [Charles Anders‟ appeal] was 
frivolous or not, but . . . simply found the petition to be 
„without merit.‟”).  See also Martin v. Knox, 502 U.S. 999, 
999 (1991) (noting the distinction between “petitions that are 
frivolous and those that are merely meritless”) (Stevens, J. 
joined by Blackmun, J.) denying cert. to 945 F.2d 395 (Table) 
(3d Cir. 1991).  Thus, courts have drawn a clear legal 
distinction between these terms that is acutely relevant in this 
case. 
 
In any event, the fact that a panel of our Court is 
divided as to the meaning of the Gillis court‟s dismissal 
indicates the problem with treating it as a strike.  Indeed, it is 
precisely this sort of uncertainty over the meaning of a prior 
court‟s dismissal of an action or appeal that we should seek to 
avoid.  The majority‟s holding will require reviewing courts 
to weed through prior opinions to determine the precise 
grounds for a dismissal, and to analyze the decision and 
possibly even the pleadings from the underlying case in an 
effort to divine what the original court‟s intention may have 
8 
 
been.  Furthermore, it will invite parties to relitigate the issues 
in those prior cases, arguing their level of merit.   
 
I believe that a more appropriate course would be to 
conclude that, in order for a dismissal to be counted as a 
strike, the decision must explicitly state that the action or 
appeal was dismissed entirely for grounds covered by 
§ 1915(g).  This approach is supported by the D.C. Circuit‟s 
reasoning in Thompson.  There, the court faced the issue of 
whether to treat a dismissal as a strike where no grounds were 
given for the dismissal.  After “weighing considerations of 
fairness, convenience, and probability,” the court held that the 
party challenging the in forma pauperis (“IFP”) motion bears 
the burden of producing evidence capable of convincing the 
court that a prior action or appeal was dismissed on one of 
§ 1915(g)‟s enumerated grounds.  Id. at 435  In so doing, the 
court reasoned that:  
 
Courts and government agencies have both the 
incentive and experience to ensure that strikes 
are identified as such at the time of dismissal.  
Counting unexplained dismissals as non-strikes 
greatly increases the chance that courts will, 
where appropriate, take the relatively easy step 
of making clear that dismissals rest on section 
1915(g) grounds, if not to preserve their own 
resources, then because government defendants 
will remind them to do so. 
 
Id. at 435; see also Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 115 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that, for the sake of efficiency, a 
district court‟s “judgment should clearly state the reasons for 
the dismissal, including whether the dismissal is because the 
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claim is „frivolous,‟ „malicious,‟ or „fails to state a claim,‟ . . . 
or for other reasons”).  The Seventh Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion in Haury, in which it held that the district court‟s 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction did not qualify as a strike, 
even if the district court may have also considered the action 
frivolous.  As noted earlier in this dissent, the Haury court 
concluded, “we cannot read into [the court‟s] decision a 
ground for dismissal that [it] did not state, and which would 
also substantially limit [the prisoner‟s] ability to file a 
lawsuit.”  Haury, 656 F.3d at 523.   
 
Requiring that an action or appeal be explicitly 
dismissed on grounds covered by § 1915(g) in order to count 
as a strike has the added benefit of clearly informing 
prisoners of their IFP status, a benefit that has been 
acknowledged by our sister circuits.  See, e.g., Paul v. 
Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]lassifying a 
dismissal as a strike depends on the grounds given for it; 
since most prisoners litigate their civil claims pro se, they 
should not be required to speculate on the grounds the judge 
could have or even should have based the dismissal on.”).  
Furthermore, this holding is in accordance with the “driving 
purpose of the PLRA [which] is to preserve the resources of 
both the courts and the defendants in prisoner litigation.”  
Thompson, 492 F.3d at 438.  That “purpose is best 
accomplished by a bright-line rule that avoids the need to 
relitigate past cases.”  Id. 
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 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent with respect to Part 
III.B of the majority opinion.
3
 
                                              
3
 I do not disagree with Part III.A of the majority opinion, 
which holds that a strike may be accrued in actions or appeals 
regardless of whether the prisoner proceeded IFP or not. 
